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NOTES

EMERGING FROM DAIMLER’S SHADOW:
REGISTRATION STATUTES AS A MEANS TO
GENERAL JURISDICTION OVER FOREIGN
CORPORATIONS
NICHOLAS D’ANGELO†
INTRODUCTION
In 1999, an American family of four travelled from Utah to
Atlantis, a luxurious Bahamian getaway, for a long-anticipated
vacation.1 Off the shores of Paradise Island, Victor, a thirteenyear-old boy, was snorkeling with his father and younger brother
when a motorboat suddenly cut through the water and hit him.2
Victor was airlifted to Florida, where he underwent medical
treatment for massive injuries.3 He survived, but his arm had
been severed, and he was permanently disfigured.4
The motorboat operator conducted business at the Atlantis
Hotel, owned by multinational corporations principally based in
the Bahamas.5 Although the corporation attempted to hide
behind its foreign citizenship, Victor and his family were able to
hold the corporation accountable through an American court’s
exercise of general jurisdiction.6
†
Notes & Comments Editor, St. John’s Law Review; J.D., 2017, St. John’s
University School of Law; B.A., cum laude, 2014, Union College. Recipient of the
2017 John R. Brown Award for Excellence in Legal Writing. The author expresses
warm gratitude to Professor Jane Scott for her guidance, insight, and mentorship.
1
See Meier v. Sun Int’l Hotels, Ltd., 288 F.3d 1264, 1267 (11th Cir. 2002).
2
Id.
3
Id.
4
Id.
5
Id.
6
Id. at 1274. See also Catherine Wilson, Utah Family Allowed To Sue in Miami
Over Bahamian Injury, FL. TIMES-UNION (Apr. 22, 2002, 6:15 PM), http://jackson
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Today, however, under the framework of a modern Supreme
Court that has “systematically restricted plaintiffs’ access to
courts,”7 Victor and his family would have few avenues available
to hold foreign corporations accountable in an American court.8
Since the United States Supreme Court’s landmark holding in
Daimler AG v. Bauman,9 this restrictive methodology has been
In that case, the Court
applied to general jurisdiction.10
narrowed the ability of states to exercise general jurisdiction over
foreign corporations by applying a “proportionality” framework.11
Now, a corporation must be considered “at home” in the forum
state in order for general jurisdiction to be exercised.12 Still, the
Court left open a significant opportunity that states should use in
order to ensure corporate accountability: consent to general
jurisdiction through business registration statutes.13 Several
states, notably New York and Delaware, have long held that
registering to do business within a state forms a contractual
relationship whereby a corporation is obligated to submit to the
jurisdiction of that state’s courts.14

ville.com/tu-online/apnews/stories/042202/D7J27CG01.html. Victor’s story was not
unique. In 2005, the same powerboat company was involved in the death of two-year
old Paul Gallagher. See Lois Rogers, Bahamas Silent Over Boy’s Death, THE SUNDAY
TIMES (London), (Apr. 3, 2005, 1:00 AM), https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/bah
amas-silent-over-boys-death-0mb565n7xbx (“The boat hit the sand and bounced over
the heads of sunbathers . . . the vessel’s propeller sliced through Paul’s head. He
died five days later.”).
7
Case Comment, Personal Jurisdiction—General Jurisdiction—Daimler AG v.
Bauman, 128 HARV. L. REV. 311, 315 (2014).
8
Victor’s family could not afford litigation in a foreign forum and the Bahamas
does not recognize jury trials for personal injury suits. See Wilson, supra note 6.
9
134 S. Ct. 746 (2014).
10
See George Bundy Smith & Thomas J. Hall, General Jurisdiction in New York
After ‘Daimler,’ N.Y. L.J., Oct. 17, 2014 (citing Chambers v. Weinstein, No.
157781/2013, 2014 WL 4276910, at *15 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cty. Aug. 22, 2014));
Natia Daviti, Daimler AG v. Bauman: A Change in the Climate of General
Jurisdiction over Foreign Corporations, 40 WESTCHESTER B.J. 7, 11 (2015).
11
Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 770 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
12
Id. at 751 (majority opinion); Goodyear Dunlop Tire Operations, S.A. v.
Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 919–20 (2011).
13
See Acorda Therapeutics, Inc. v. Mylan Pharm., Inc., 78 F. Supp. 3d 572, 576
(D. Del. 2015) (noting that Daimler does not address consent-based general
jurisdiction), aff’d, 817 F.3d 755, 757 (Fed. Cir. 2016); see also Gucci Am., Inc. v.
Weixing Li, 768 F.3d 122, 136 n.15 (2d Cir. 2014) (noting that a court could consider
whether a corporation consented to jurisdiction through registration).
14
See Sternberg v. O’Neil, 550 A.2d 1105, 1113 (Del. 1988). But see Genuine
Parts Co. v. Cepec, 137 A.3d 123, 127 (Del. 2016). See also Frummer v. Hilton Hotels
Int’l, Inc., 19 N.Y.2d 533, 536, 227 N.E.2d 851, 853, 281 N.Y.S.2d 41, 43 (1967).
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This Note argues for the increased exercise of general
jurisdiction based on registration statutes.15 Carefully drafted
state statutes, explicitly stating that corporations registering to
do business in a state thereby consent to general jurisdiction, not
only solve the consequences of Daimler, but also fully comport
with traditional values of fairness.
Part I outlines the jurisprudential history related to general
jurisdiction. Section A begins with the concept of territoriality
introduced in Pennoyer and the minimum contacts analysis in
International Shoe, then discusses the modern doctrine in
Perkins, Helicopteros, and Goodyear, culminating with Daimler.
Section B outlines the jurisprudence of consent-based jurisdiction
before Daimler. Next, Part II addresses the consequences of
Daimler and how lower courts have interpreted and implemented
the decision. Finally, Part III discusses statutory solutions.
Section A summarizes legislation pending in New York that
would codify consent-based jurisdiction. Section B addresses the
criticisms of consent to jurisdiction based on registration
statutes. Finally, Section C suggests improvements to legislation
to ensure corporate accountability.
I.

BACKGROUND LAW

When a court determines whether it has jurisdiction over the
parties to a civil action, it divides that analysis into two avenues:
specific jurisdiction and general jurisdiction.16
Specific
jurisdiction is based solely on the relationship between the forum
state and the events giving rise to the cause of action and exists
when those events occurred within the state.17 In contrast,
general jurisdiction is based on the relationship between the
forum state and one of the parties to the suit without regard to
the geographical location of the dispute being litigated.18 The

15
Similar to other works addressing this topic, this Note will not discuss the
potential Interstate Commerce Clause issues related to registration statutes and
general jurisdiction. See Tanya J. Monestier, Registration Statutes, General
Jurisdiction, and the Fallacy of Consent, 36 CARDOZO L. REV. 1343, 1362 n.106
(2015).
16
See Lea Brilmayer, et al., A General Look at General Jurisdiction, 66 TEX. L.
REV. 721, 726 (1988).
17
See Arthur T. von Mehren & Donald T. Trautman, Jurisdiction to Adjudicate:
A Suggested Analysis, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1121, 1136 (1966).
18
See Mary Twitchell, The Myth of General Jurisdiction, 101 HARV. L. REV. 610,
627 (1988) (referring to general jurisdiction as “dispute-blind”).
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authority of the state is a central feature of both forms of
jurisdiction.
From the earliest articulations of personal
jurisdiction, the sovereignty of the forum state has played a
pivotal role.19
A.

General Jurisdiction: Pennoyer to Daimler

1.

Historical Foundation: Pennoyer and International Shoe

The long-running debate over the definition and extent of
state authority over non-resident defendants was sparked in
1877. In Pennoyer v. Neff,20 the United States Supreme Court
defined personal jurisdiction as limited to the territorial
boundaries of the state.21 States remained all-powerful within
their borders, but were limited in obtaining jurisdiction over outof-state defendants. For over sixty years territoriality reigned.
Then, in 1945, a new Court began to adapt the doctrine to an
evolving world.
In International Shoe v. Washington,22 the Court addressed
whether a state could adjudicate proceedings against a foreign
corporation23 based only on activities of that corporation within
the forum.24 The difficulty the Court wrestled with involved the
personhood of a corporate entity.25 Although the fiction of
corporate personhood had existed since the mid-19th century,26
corporations differ from individuals in that they can be “present”
in multiple jurisdictions simultaneously.27 Therefore, the Court
19

See Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437, 440 (1952).
95 U.S. 714 (1877).
21
Id. at 729. Neff had hired John Mitchell, an attorney, to help obtain a land
grant in Oregon. Id. at 715. Neff was ultimately successful in gaining the land, but
Mitchell brought suit in Oregon for outstanding legal debts owed by Neff. Id. at 716.
After Mitchell won a default judgment, he assigned the land to Pennoyer, resulting
in this suit. Id.
22
326 U.S. 310 (1945).
23
“Foreign corporation” refers to any corporation that comes into the state, but
is neither incorporated nor has its principal place of business there. In this sense, a
foreign corporation could be from another country or merely from another state.
24
Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 311.
25
Id. at 316.
26
See Trs. of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. 518, 650 (1819); Pembina
Consol. Silver Mining & Milling Co. v. Pennsylvania, 125 U.S. 181, 189 (1888); see
also Roger M. Michalski, Rights Come with Responsibilities: Personal Jurisdiction in
the Age of Corporate Personhood, 50 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 125, 134 (2013).
27
Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 314. International Shoe was incorporated in Delaware,
with a principal place of business in Missouri. Id. at 313.
20
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reasoned, it becomes necessary to examine the interactions that
the corporation has with the state to determine if jurisdiction
comports with constitutional due process.28 Even though there
may be no express consent to be sued, the extended presence of a
corporation within the forum based on certain minimum contacts
with the state is enough to subject it to jurisdiction.29
Such action satisfies due process because of a quid pro quo
relationship.30 A corporation gains the privileges and protections
of the state by operating within the state in exchange for the
obligation to submit to the state’s judicial process.31 All that due
process requires of an out-of-state defendant is that the entity
have certain minimum contacts with the forum “such that the
maintenance of the suit does not offend ‘traditional notions of fair
play and substantial justice.’ ”32 Applying this test, the Court
determined that International Shoe’s contacts with the state
were “systematic and continuous,”33 and thus the corporation was
amenable to suit.

28

Id. at 316–17.
Id. at 317.
30
See Twitchell, supra note 18, at 621.
31
Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 319; see also Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A.
v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 422 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (arguing that as active
members in “interstate and foreign commerce,” corporations coming into the state
should be subjected to jurisdiction).
32
Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316 (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463
(1940)).
33
Id. at 320. The suit revolved around a Washington tax on businesses to
contribute to a state unemployment fund and arose out of the company’s contacts
with the state of Washington. International Shoe had avoided the tax by not having
a permanent business site. The Court determined that 11 to 13 employees renting
space, selling products, and earning compensation was enough to establish
jurisdiction. Id. The minimum contacts analysis is a test based on reasonableness:
do the contacts between the corporation and the forum reach a minimum threshold
where it would be fair to subject the corporation to suit? See World-Wide
Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292 (1980). The minimum contacts
analysis has been criticized over the decades following International Shoe for being
“confusing,” “vague,” and “uncertain.” See Kevin C. McMunigal, Desert, Utility, and
Minimum Contacts: Toward a Mixed Theory of Personal Jurisdiction, 108 YALE L.J.
189, 189 (1998).
29
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While the holding has been expanded and clarified since the
case was decided,34 International Shoe has remained the genesis
of modern personal jurisdiction analysis. However, the Court has
been less effective in articulating the more specific scope of a
state’s jurisdiction over a foreign corporation when the cause of
action is not related to the corporation’s activities within the
state.
2.

Modern Doctrine: Perkins and Helicopteros

In the arena of modern general jurisdiction jurisprudence,
Perkins v. Benguet Consolidated Mining Co.35 serves as the
starting point.36 In Perkins, a shareholder of Benguet Mining
sued the company in Ohio for actions unrelated to events in that
state.37
Although the company originally operated in the
Philippines, its operations halted after the Japanese invasion
during World War II.38 During the Japanese occupation, the
company’s president returned to his home in Ohio and ran the
company from there.39 The Court held that subjecting a foreign
corporation to the jurisdiction of Ohio under these circumstances
comported with due process.40 The Court reasoned that the
business done in Ohio was “sufficiently substantial” to justify
jurisdiction.41 Therefore, it did not violate due process to hold the
company amenable to suit in Ohio, even though the cause of
action did not result from its activities in the forum.42

34
For example, in Hanson v. Denckla, the Court explained that minimum
contacts require “some act [of the corporation] by which the [corporation]
purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum
State, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws.” 357 U.S. 235, 253
(1958).
35
342 U.S. 437 (1952).
36
Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 755 (2014) (referring to Perkins as the
“textbook case” for general jurisdiction in post-International Shoe jurisprudence).
37
Perkins, 342 U.S. at 439. Idonah Slade Perkins, a non-resident of Ohio and a
stockholder in the Benguet Mining, brought suit seeking unpaid dividends and
damages relating to those shares. Id.
38
Id. at 447–48.
39
Id. The company president maintained an office in Ohio, where he kept office
files, distributed salary checks, maintained company funds in two bank accounts,
and held several directors’ meetings. Id. at 448.
40
Id. at 438.
41
Id. at 447.
42
Id. at 448. The difference between the International Shoe and Perkins
analyses is the focus on where the cause of action arose in relation to the state.
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Since Perkins, the case law governing general jurisdiction
has been limited.43 It was not until 1984, in Helicopteros
Nacionales v. Hall,44 that the Supreme Court laid out a limited
rubric for establishing general jurisdiction. In that case, a
Colombian corporation, which provided helicopter transportation
for oil and construction companies in South America, purchased
helicopters from a Texas corporation.45 The contracts were
negotiated in Texas, the helicopters were manufactured in Texas,
and prospective pilots were trained in Texas.46 When an accident
in Peru involving one of the helicopters killed four Americans,
their families brought suit in Texas state courts.47
In deciding whether jurisdiction over the foreign corporation
could be asserted, the Court laid out a two-part test.48 First, a
court must determine whether the defendant had “continuous
and systematic” contacts with the forum.49 Second, a court must
decide whether the exercise of jurisdiction comports with due
process.50 Finding that the Colombian corporation’s contacts
were not continuous and systematic, the Court held that
extending jurisdiction over the corporation would not comport
with due process.51 “[M]ere purchases” occurring regularly were
not enough to give rise to a state’s exercise of general
jurisdiction.52 This ruling exacerbated the confusion over the
scope of general jurisdiction, leaving it unclear what facts and
circumstances could demonstrate continuous and systematic
activity. For thirty years after Helicopteros, the confusion
persisted.

43
See Brilmayer et al., supra note 16, at 724 (noting that, at the time of
publication, only two Supreme Court cases since 1952 had discussed general
jurisdiction, Perkins and Helicopteros).
44
466 U.S. 408 (1984).
45
Id. at 409–10.
46
Id. at 410–11. Despite these contacts, the corporation had never registered to
do business in Texas and never appointed an agent for service of process. Id. at 411.
47
Id. at 412.
48
Id. at 415–16. This two-part test was an attempt to harmonize the pieces of
the jurisdiction analysis explained in International Shoe and Perkins. See Perkins v.
Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437, 438 (1952); Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington,
326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945).
49
Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 416.
50
Id. at 418.
51
Id. at 418–19.
52
Id. at 418.
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The Sea Change: Goodyear and Daimler

As lower courts began to interpret and apply the Supreme
Court’s general jurisdiction doctrine, it became clear that there
was a lack of uniformity and understanding.53 To address that
problem, the Supreme Court decided a pair of cases in 2011 and
2014 to clarify the extent of a state’s jurisdiction over foreign
defendants.54
In 2011, in Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v.
Brown,55 the Court began to refine the “continuous and
systematic” contacts test for the exercise of jurisdiction,
originally expressed in Perkins.56 In Goodyear, the families of
two North Carolina teenagers brought suit against Goodyear Tire
and its various foreign subsidiaries.57
During a soccer tournament abroad, two teenagers died in a
fatal bus accident in Paris caused by a defective tire
manufactured by Goodyear Turkey.58 When suit was brought in
North Carolina state courts, jurisdiction over the foreign
companies was disputed.59 The trial court determined that it had
general jurisdiction over the foreign subsidiaries and the North
Carolina Court of Appeals affirmed.60 On appeal to the U.S.

53

See Brilmayer et al., supra note 16, at 724; Twitchell, supra note 18, at 611,

629.
54
Thomas C. Arthur & Richard D. Freer, Be Careful What You Wish for:
Goodyear, Daimler, and the Evisceration of General Jurisdiction, 64 EMORY L.J.
ONLINE 2001, 2002 (2014) (arguing that while academia hoped the U.S. Supreme
Court would clarify the general jurisdiction analysis, Goodyear and Daimler should
have been decided on narrower grounds).
55
564 U.S. 915 (2011).
56
Id. at 919; see Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437, 445
(1952).
57
Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 918. Named in the suit were Goodyear Luxembourg,
Goodyear Turkey, and Goodyear France, all incorporated and having their principal
places of business in those countries. Id. None of the subsidiaries were registered to
do business in North Carolina. Id. at 921. However, Goodyear USA, an Ohio
corporation, was registered to do business in North Carolina and never questioned
jurisdiction. Id. at 920–21.
58
Id. at 920.
59
Id. at 919. Jurisdiction was disputed because the foreign subsidiaries lacked
the “continuous and systematic” contacts with North Carolina that would have made
jurisdiction proper. Id. at 919–20.
60
Id. at 921–22.
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Supreme Court, Justice Ginsburg accused the North Carolina
courts of “[c]onfusing or blending general and specific
jurisdictional inquiries.”61
Clarifying the test for general jurisdiction, Justice Ginsburg
wrote that a state may only exercise general jurisdiction over
foreign corporations “when their affiliations with the State are so
‘continuous and systematic’ as to render them essentially at
home in the forum State.”62 Under this test, North Carolina did
not have jurisdiction over the foreign subsidiaries, because they
could not be considered “at home” in the state.63 While the Court
may have intended this new “at home” test to clear the murky
waters of general jurisdiction, confusion persisted.
In 2014, the Supreme Court again attempted to refine the
framework for general jurisdiction by clarifying Goodyear’s “at
home” rubric.64
The chosen suit, though, involved foreign
plaintiffs taking advantage of U.S. law to sue foreign defendants
over foreign events and, as a result, was a poor vehicle for
reform. After the death of long-time Argentine president Juan
Peron in 1974, a political vacuum resulted in a power struggle
that plunged the country into chaos.65 From 1974 to 1983, the
Argentine Military Government orchestrated an epoch of state
terrorism, hunting down political opponents, academics, lawyers,
and sympathizers.66 The official death count of the “Dirty War” is
9,000, but human rights groups have estimated as many as
30,000 victims.67
61
Id. at 919–20. The North Carolina court relied on a “stream of commerce”
theory, whereby jurisdiction is gained over a corporation due to its purposeful
placement of products in the forum state. Id. at 920. However, Justice Ginsburg
noted that the “stream of commerce” theory only applies to the exercise of specific
jurisdiction. Id. at 927. Therefore, states have an interest in adjudicating matters
caused by foreign corporations purposefully targeting products to the forum state or
reasonably foreseeing the products eventually reaching the forum. Id. at 926–27; see
also World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980).
62
Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 919.
63
Id. at 929.
64
See Howard M. Erichson, The Home-State Test for General Personal
Jurisdiction, 66 VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 81, 82–83 (2013).
65
See PATRICIA MARCHAK & WILLIAM MARCHAK, GOD’S ASSASSINS: STATE
TERRORISM IN ARGENTINA IN THE 1970S 120–22 (1999).
66
See RICHARD MORROCK, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF GENOCIDE AND VIOLENT
OPPRESSION: A STUDY OF MASS CRUELTY FROM NAZI GERMANY TO RWANDA 184
(2010).
67
See Jorge Rafael Videla, Death of a ‘Dirty War’ Criminal, ECONOMIST:
AMERICAS VIEW (May 23, 2013, 12:11 PM), http://www.economist.com/blogs/amer
icasview/2013/05/jorge-rafael-videla.
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Two decades later, a group of victims and relatives brought
suit against DaimlerChrysler under the United States’ Alien Tort
Statute (“ATS”) and the Torture Victims Protection Act
The plaintiffs contended that
(“TVPA”)68 in California.69
Daimler’s subsidiary, Mercedes-Benz Argentina, had collaborated
with the Argentine military and police forces to intimidate,
kidnap, and murder union agitators.70 The question presented by
this unusual case was whether the court could constitutionally
exercise jurisdiction over Daimler based on the California
contacts of its subsidiary, Mercedes-Benz USA, for alleged crimes
by the Argentine subsidiary.71 The District Court for the
Northern District of California held that it could not.72
The Ninth Circuit reversed, deciding that jurisdiction was
reasonable and articulating three justifications.73 First, Daimler
had injected itself into California courts by initiating lawsuits
there for years.74 Second, as an international corporation,
Daimler would not be overly burdened by litigating in
California.75 Third, California had an interest in the suit because
Daimler had inserted itself into the California market and
because the United States generally maintains an interest in
redressing international human rights violations.76 Therefore,
the Ninth Circuit held that the exercise of general jurisdiction
was proper.

68
Both statutes provide a cause of action for certain violations of international
human rights, stressing the United States’ interest in providing a forum for redress.
See Philip Mariani, Assessing the Proper Relationship Between the Alien Torture
Statute and the Torture Victim Protection Act, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1383, 1392–93
(2008).
69
See Bauman v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 644 F.3d 909, 911–12 (9th Cir. 2011),
rev’d sub nom. Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746 (2014).
70
Id. at 912.
71
Id. at 913–14, 919.
72
Id. at 917–18.
73
Id. at 931.
74
Id. at 925. Daimler had initiated lawsuits in California courts to challenge the
state’s clean air laws and to protect its own patents and business interests. Id. at
917. Moreover, Daimler had retained permanent counsel within the state. Id. at 918.
75
Id. at 926 (citing Sinatra v. Nat’l Enquirer, Inc., 854 F.2d 1191, 1199 (9th Cir.
1988)).
76
Id. at 925 (“[T]he sale of DCAG’s vehicles in California ‘is not an isolated
occurrence but arises from the efforts of DCAG to serve the California market.’ ”); see
id. at 927.
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In Daimler AG v. Bauman,77 the Supreme Court granted
certiorari and reversed.78 The Court framed the issue as whether
California was precluded from exercising general jurisdiction
“given the absence of any California connection to the atrocities,
perpetrators, or victims.”79 Answering in the affirmative, the
Court clarified language from Goodyear.80 Justice Ginsberg
explained that while a corporation’s place of incorporation and
principal place of business are not the only forums that satisfy
the “at home” test for general jurisdiction, those locations are the
“paradigm all-purpose forums.”81
The Court stressed predictability. If Daimler could be sued
in California for a case originating in Argentina, then the
corporation could be sued in any state in which its subsidiaries’
sales were “sizeable.”82 And if that were the case, corporations
would never be able to conduct their affairs “with some minimum
assurance as to where that conduct will and will not render them
liable to suit.”83 Therefore, the proper analysis to determine
whether a corporation is essentially “at home” in the forum state
is to compare its contacts with the forum with its relative
contacts globally.84
Concurring in the judgment, Justice Sotomayor disagreed
with the Court’s reasoning.85 Concerned that the Court was
essentially uprooting personal jurisdiction precedent and due
process jurisprudence,86 Justice Sotomayor characterized the
majority’s approach as determining “not that Daimler’s contacts
with California [were] too few, but that its contacts with other
forums [were] too many.”87 She charged that, by adopting such
an approach, the Court had discarded “the lodestar” of personal

77

134 S. Ct. 746 (2014).
Id. at 751.
79
Id.
80
Id. at 760 (citing Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S.
915, 923–24 (2011).
81
Id.
82
Id. at 761.
83
Id. at 762 (quoting Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472
(1985)). But see World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 311 (1980)
(Brennan, J., dissenting) (arguing it is a “commercial reality” that corporations may
be amenable to suit in many states).
84
Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 751.
85
Id. at 763 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
86
Id. at 764.
87
Id.
78
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jurisdiction analysis: “[I]f the defendant has sufficiently taken
advantage of the State’s laws,” the “State may subject the
defendant to the burden of suit.”88 Therefore, she argued, a
defendant’s contacts outside the forum have always been, and
should have remained, immaterial.89
Instead, Justice Sotomayor took a different approach.
Foremost in her analysis was the concept of reciprocal fairness.
After all, it simply cannot be fair for a corporation to avail itself
of the forum and then immunize itself from suit therein.90
Moreover, the majority’s approach actually diminished the
predictability that had always been a centerpiece of jurisdiction
analyses, because it created an uncertain comparison framework
between the corporation’s forum contacts and its global
contacts.91 Finally, there is nothing unpredictable about a rule
forcing multinational corporations to be prepared for suit in any
forum with which they have substantial contacts.92
Further, Justice Sotomayor reiterated the importance of a
state’s sovereignty in regulating corporations within its
boundaries.93 She charged that, by ignoring this principle, the
Court had defined general jurisdiction “so narrowly and
arbitrarily as to contravene the States’ sovereign prerogative” to
hold corporations accountable.94 In Justice Sotomayor’s view, the
policy concerns that the majority addressed should be left to the
individual state legislatures to resolve.95

88

Id.
Id.; see also Judy M. Cornett and Michael H. Hoffheimer, Good-Bye
Significant Contacts: General Personal Jurisdiction After Daimler AG v. Bauman, 76
OHIO ST. L.J. 101, 104 (2015) (arguing that “Daimler departs from settled law”).
90
See Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 768 (citing Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S.
310, 319 (1945)); see also Brilmayer et al., supra note 16, at 742 (“We should not
treat defendants as less amenable to suit merely because they carry on more
substantial business in other states.”).
91
See Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 770 (“[T]he majority does not even try to explain
just how extensive the company’s in-state contacts must be in the context of its
global operations in order for general jurisdiction to be proper.”).
92
Id.
93
Id. at 772.
94
Id.
95
Id. at 771; see also Lea Brilmayer, Consent, Contract, and Territory, 74 MINN.
L. REV. 1, 28 (1989) (“Territorial sovereignty exists and is a reasonable basis for
state power.”).
89
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Finally, she argued, the majority approach would insulate
massive international corporations while simultaneously
punishing smaller domestic companies.96 Under the majority’s
framework, a small business operating solely in California, but
producing a fraction of Daimler’s production, could be held liable
in a California court, while Daimler could not.97 Thus, she
reasoned, the Daimler majority had made goliath corporations,
known in a different context as “too big to fail,”98 also “too big for
general jurisdiction.”99
Daimler v. Bauman was meant to finally clarify the
unanswered questions surrounding general and specific
jurisdiction and the appropriate instances in which both may be
invoked.100 However, there is a crucial area that has not been
addressed.101 Consent-based jurisdiction, whereby a state may
exercise jurisdiction over a defendant based on an authorizing
state statute, is one of the last open questions in this juridical
realm and a powerful tool to remedy the restrictions on general
jurisdiction imposed by Daimler.
Consent-Based Jurisdiction: Pre-Daimler

B.

Ancillary to its general jurisdiction analysis, the U.S.
Supreme Court has long relied on the “doing business” test to
justify the exercise of general jurisdiction, whereby a corporation
is amenable to suit in the forum state based on its registration to
conduct business in that state.102 For a century, the Supreme
Court and lower courts have articulated the necessity and
legitimacy of this avenue to jurisdiction. This theory of express
96

See Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 772.
Id. While car production itself had nothing to do with the cause of action, the
manufacturing of cars in California helped establish Daimler’s contacts with the
forum. Id.
98
“Too big to fail” refers to a corporation so large that the national economy
depends on it. Therefore, it cannot fail because a domino effect would ensue. See
Catherine Rampell, Defining “Too Big to Fail,” N.Y. TIMES: ECONOMIX BLOG (Aug.
20, 2009, 5:08 PM), http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/08/20/defining-too-bigto-fail.
99
Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 764 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
100
See Case Comment, supra note 7, at 311.
101
See Linda J. Silberman, Daimler AG v. Bauman: A New Era for Judicial
Jurisdiction in the United States 237 (N.Y.U. Pub. Law & Legal Theory Working
Papers, Paper No. 522, 2015), http://lsr.nellco.org/nyu_plltwp/522 (listing significant
questions left open by Daimler, including consent based on registration statutes).
102
See Ball v. Metallurgie Hoboken-Overpelt, S.A., 902 F.2d 194, 198 (2d Cir.
1990) (defining the “doing business” test under New York C.P.L.R. § 301).
97
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consent is based on the state’s interest in keeping corporations
accountable, as well as honoring the contract developed between
the state and the corporation through the latter’s registration to
conduct business in the former.
1.

Early Twentieth-Century Application

As corporations grew at the onset of the twentieth century,
so did public concern over their power and “seeming ability to
swallow or to ruin effective competitors and to control consumer
prices at will.”103 Moreover, with corporations expanding across
state borders, courts sensed a social duty to ensure fairness.104 In
Pennsylvania Fire Insurance Co. of Philadelphia v. Gold Issue
Mining and Milling Co.,105 Justice Holmes articulated the
legitimacy of a state’s regulation of corporations operating within
its borders, drawing on New York case law.106 In Pennsylvania
Fire, an Arizona company purchased an insurance policy for
buildings in Colorado, and then brought suit against the insurer
The insurance company argued that its
in Missouri.107
registration to do business in Missouri made it amenable only to
suits arising out of its Missouri contracts.108 The court disagreed,
holding that the exercise of jurisdiction was valid because the
company had consented to suit by registering to do business.109
While the court conceded that consent may be a “mere fiction,” it

103
See Leroy G. Dorsey, Theodore Roosevelt and Corporate America, 1901-1909:
A Reexamination, 25 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 725, 732 (1995).
104
See Theodore H. Davis, Jr., Note, Corporate Privileges for the Public Benefit:
The Progressive Federal Incorporation Movement and the Modern Regulatory State,
77 VA. L. REV. 603, 603 (1991); see also Nicastro v. McIntyre Mach. Am., Ltd., 201
N.J. 48, 61 (2010), rev’d sub nom. J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873
(2011) (recounting the history of the expansion of general jurisdiction in relation to
economic growth).
105
243 U.S. 93 (1917).
106
Id. at 95, 97.
107
Id. at 94. Suit could properly be brought in Missouri, despite the contract at
issue being executed in Colorado, because the defendant had formed a contract with
the state. Id. In exchange for the privilege of doing business with Missouri, its
Missouri Insurance Superintendant would accept service on its behalf, thus
authorizing general jurisdiction. See Richard B. Cappalli, Locke as the Key: A
Unifying and Coherent Theory of In Personam Jurisdiction, 43 CASE W. RES. L. REV.
97, 138 n.130 (1992).
108
Pa. Fire Ins. Co. of Phila., 243 U.S. at 94–95 (1917).
109
Id. at 95.
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was justified because it placed the out-of-state corporation on the
same footing as a local corporation operating within the state
borders.110
During the same period, New York courts, and especially the
New York Court of Appeals under Chief Judge Cardozo’s
leadership, played a unique role as proponents of broad general
jurisdiction.111 Two seminal cases from this era, both authored
by Chief Judge Cardozo, articulate New York’s long-standing
support for corporate accountability. In Bagdon v. Philadelphia
& Reading Coal & Iron,112 a New York resident brought suit
against a Pennsylvania company after he was injured while
working in Pennsylvania.113 The company sought to avoid
jurisdiction by arguing that it was only accountable for actions
occurring within New York.114 Noting that New York requires
foreign corporations to obtain a certificate in order to conduct
business within the state,115 Chief Judge Cardozo reasoned that
this registration creates a contract between the state and the
company: the privilege of doing business is received in exchange

110
Id. at 96; see also Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 773 (2014)
(Sotomayor, J., concurring).
111
Chief Judge Cardozo has been referred to as the “ultimate scholar judge.” He
served eighteen years on the New York Court of Appeals before being appointed to
the U.S. Supreme Court in 1932. See William H. Rehnquist, Remarks on the Process
of Judging, 49 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 263, 264 (1992). Chief Judge Cardozo developed
a strong record of regulating corporate behavior during this period. See, e.g., Globe
Woolen Co. v. Utica Gas & Elec. Co., 224 N.Y. 483, 121 N.E. 378 (1918) (conflict of
interest in corporate contracts); Berkey v. Third Ave. Ry. Co., 244 N.Y. 84, 155 N.E.
58 (1926) (piercing the corporate veil); Meinhard v. Salmon, 249 N.Y. 458, 164 N.E.
545 (1928) (fiduciary duty owed partners). Because it is focused on his work while
serving on the New York Court of Appeals, this Note refers to Cardozo as “Chief
Judge.” See Joseph W. Bellacosa, Benjamin Nathaniel Cardozo: The Teacher, 16
Cardozo L. Rev. 2415, 2417 (1995) (“Though he earned the title Associate Justice of
the United States Supreme Court, I know you will not mind that I refer to him as
the Chief Judge of the New York State Court of Appeals, the title New Yorkers
affectionately cherish the most, because it is associated with his eighteen years of
service and leadership on our great common law tribunal.”).
112
217 N.Y. 432, 111 N.E. 1075 (1916).
113
Id. at 433, 111 N.E. at 1075. The company also made a contract to
compensate the worker, but subsequently reneged on that agreement. Id., 111 N.E.
at 1075.
114
Id. at 433–34, 111 N.E. at 1075.
115
Id. at 436, 111 N.E. at 1076.
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for submitting to jurisdiction.116 Therefore, New York had
jurisdiction over the Pennsylvania company even though the
cause of action had no relation to transactions within the state.117
Just one year later, the Court of Appeals reaffirmed the
extension of jurisdiction. In Tauza v. Susquehanna Coal,118 a
New York resident brought suit against a Pennsylvania coal
company.119 In addressing the state’s jurisdictional authority,
Chief Judge Cardozo conducted a minimum contacts analysis
nearly three decades before the United States Supreme Court
would adopt such a test in International Shoe.120
Chief Judge Cardozo began the analysis by noting that
process had been served on an appointed agent, unlike in Tauza,
where process had been served on an officer of the defendant
corporation.121 Yet, according to Chief Judge Cardozo, service on
an agent similarly satisfied the test for state jurisdiction. All
that need be determined is “that the corporation is here.”122 To
Chief Judge Cardozo, this was simple fairness.123 Whether that
defined agent is an officer of the corporation or a state official
makes no difference.124 If the corporation “is here”—that is, if it
is taking advantage of the privileges and protections of the
state—then the state has jurisdiction over the corporation,
regardless of where the cause of action arose.125
As a consequence of economic globalization, New York state
courts relied on Tauza and Bagdon to provide justice for state
residents.126 Decades later, in Bryant v. Finnish National

116

Id. at 437, 111 N.E. at 1076; see also Brilmayer, supra note 95 at 17–21.
Bagdon, 217 N.Y. at 438, 111 N.E. at 1077. Other states had reached the
same conclusion. Id., 111 N.E. at 1077 (citing Johnston v. Trade Ins. Co., 132 Mass.
432 (Mass. 1882); Reeves v. S. Ry. Co., 49 S.E. 674 (Ga. 1905)).
118
220 N.Y. 259, 115 N.E. 915 (1917).
119
Id. at 265, 115 N.E. at 916.
120
See id., 115 N.E. at 916; see also Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310,
316 (1945).
121
Compare Bagdon, 217 N.Y. at 433, 111 N.E. at 1075, with Tauza, 220 N.Y. at
268–69, 115 N.E. at 918.
122
Tauza, 220 N.Y. at 268, 115 N.E. at 918.
123
Id. at 269, 115 N.E. at 918; see also Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746,
771 (2014) (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (noting that the task of weighing policy
concerns belongs to legislators).
124
Tauza, 220 N.Y. at 268, 115 N.E. at 918. Both cases involved New York’s
General Corporation Law. Id., 115 N.E. at 918.
125
Id., 115 N.E. at 918.
126
See, e.g., Elish v. St. Louis S.W. Ry. Co., 305 N.Y. 267, 112 N.E.2d 842 (1953);
Simonson v. Int’l Bank, 14 N.Y.2d 281, 200 N.E.2d 427, 251 N.Y.S.2d 433 (1964).
117
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Airlines,127 a New York resident brought suit against a Finnish
airline for an accident caused by the corporation’s negligence in
Paris.128 Relying on Tauza, the Court of Appeals held that the
Finnish corporation was amenable to suit in New York based on
its compliance with the business registration statute and its
active business contacts within the state.129 The court reasoned
that the test for exercising jurisdiction over a foreign corporation
“should be a simple pragmatic one.”130
These cases make up New York’s century-old tradition of
consent-based jurisdiction, demonstrating a judicial response to
ensure fairness. By protecting the powers of the legislature to
hold corporations accountable, New York has set a standard for
ensuring that state residents may bring causes of action against
foreign corporations that avail themselves of the forum.
2.

The Federal Circuit Courts and Consent-Based Jurisdiction
Pre-Daimler

While New York’s highest court was defining the scope of
consent-based jurisdiction, federal courts were also wrestling
with this theory of extending general jurisdiction. In the decades
preceding Daimler, commentators split on the legitimacy of
basing general jurisdiction on business registration statutes as
well as the overall scope of general jurisdiction.131 Between 1971
and 2008, most federal circuits found occasion to rule on this
question.132 The result has been a three-way split among the
Circuits. The First, Third, and Eighth Circuits have held that
business registration statutes are a valid means of establishing a

127

15 N.Y.2d 426, 208 N.E.2d 439, 260 N.Y.S.2d 625 (1965).
Id. at 428–29, 208 N.E.2d at 439, 260 N.Y.S.2d at 626. The plaintiff was
struck by a baggage cart that was blown by an “excessive blast of air” from one of the
defendant’s aircrafts. Id. at 429, 208 N.E.2d at 439, 260 N.Y.S.2d at 626.
129
Id. at 428, 431, 208 N.E.2d at 439, 441, 260 N.Y.S.2d at 626, 628. Bryant
essentially applied a two-part recipe for jurisdiction: the registration to do business
plus the sufficient contacts between the corporation and the state. This analysis is
best suited for consent-based jurisdiction. See infra Part III, Section C.
130
See Bryant, 15 N.Y.2d at 432, 208 N.E.2d at 441, 260 N.Y.S.2d at 629.
131
See Charles W. Rhodes, Clarifying General Jurisdiction, 34 SETON HALL L.
REV. 807, 809 (2004) (outlining different theories on the scope of general
jurisdiction).
132
See Takeda GmbH v. Mylan Pharms. Inc., Civ. Action No.: 15-3384
(FLW)(DEA), 2016 WL 146443, at *3 (D. N.J. Jan. 12, 2016) (discussing the circuit
split as to whether consent-by-registration remains a viable basis for general
jurisdiction).
128
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corporation’s consent to general jurisdiction.133 The Fifth and
Ninth Circuits have held that a state may condition general
jurisdiction on registration statutes; however, the registration
statutes in question in those cases were not sufficiently specific
to grant consent.134 Finally, the Fourth and Seventh Circuits
have held that a state registration requirement cannot provide a
corporation’s consent to general jurisdiction.135 These cases
reveal the importance of the specific statutory language and the
necessity of some activity in addition to registration.
a.

The First Circuit: Consent Authorizes Jurisdiction

In Holloway v. Wright & Morrissey, Inc.,136 the First Circuit
determined that as long as a cause of action was within the scope
of the agent’s authority, the corporation had consented to
jurisdiction based on its registration to do business.137 In that
case, a New Hampshire resident brought suit against his
employer, a Vermont corporation, for injuries he sustained on a
Pursuant to New
New Hampshire construction site.138
Hampshire’s long-arm statute, plaintiff served process on the
corporation’s in-state agent,139 but the District Court of New
Hampshire dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction.140
Subsequently, the First Circuit reversed.141
As a matter of statutory interpretation, the First Circuit
determined that New Hampshire’s long-arm statute was
sufficiently broad to encompass jurisdiction based on the
separate business registration statute.142 The court reasoned
that if the New Hampshire legislature had intended to restrict
133
See, e.g., Holloway v. Wright & Morrissey, Inc., 739 F.2d 695 (1st Cir. 1984);
Bane v. Netlink, Inc., 925 F.2d 637 (3d Cir. 1991); Knowlton v. Allied Van Lines, Inc.
900 F.2d 1196 (8th Cir. 1990).
134
See, e.g., Wenche Siemer v. Learjet Acquisition Corp., 966 F.2d 179 (5th Cir.
1992); King v. Am. Family Mut. Ins., 632 F.3d 570 (9th Cir. 2011).
135
See, e.g., Ratcliff v. Cooper Labs., Inc., 444 F.2d 745 (4th Cir. 1971); Wilson v.
Humphreys (Cayman) Ltd., 916 F.2d 1239 (7th Cir. 1990).
136
739 F.2d 695 (1st Cir. 1984).
137
Id. at 697.
138
Id. at 696.
139
Id. at 696 n.1.
140
Id. at 696.
141
Id. The opinion was authored by Justice Potter Stewart, retired and sitting
by designation. See E. Jon A. Gryskiewicz, The Semi-Retirement of Senior Supreme
Court Justices: Examining Their Service on the Courts of Appeals, 11 SETON HALL
CIR. REV. 285, 295 (2015).
142
Holloway, 739 F.2d at 697–98.
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the applicability of the provision, it would have done so.143 The
statute did not require that the cause of action occur within the
state; in fact, earlier language imposing such a requirement had
been deliberately removed by the legislature.144 Therefore, the
court held that the clear language of the statute ensured that the
exercise of general jurisdiction was constitutional.145
b.

The Seventh and Ninth Circuits: Consent Alone Is Not Enough

Other circuit courts, construing different statutes, have
determined that registering to do business alone is not sufficient
to grant general jurisdiction. In Wilson v. Humphreys (Cayman),
Ltd.,146 the Seventh Circuit rejected plaintiff’s argument that
Holiday Inns, a Tennessee corporation, had consented to general
jurisdiction through its registration to do business in Indiana.147
Registering to do business was a “necessary precursor” to
conducting business in Indiana and, standing alone, could not act
as authorization for the court’s exercise of jurisdiction.148 The
Indiana registration statute never mentioned the state’s exercise
of jurisdiction.149
Therefore, jurisdiction would require
registration plus some greater activity within the forum.150
The Ninth Circuit took up the validity of consent-based
jurisdiction in 2011, in King v. American Family Mutual
There, a Wisconsin insurance company
Insurance.151
contemplated expanding its business to Montana.152 Comporting
with Montana law, the company registered to do business in the
state as part of its exploration.153 However, it never actually

143
Id. at 697. Justice Stewart noted that the legislature had, in fact, restricted
the language in other statutes, including Subsection IV of the long-arm statute. Id.
144
Id. at 699.
145
Id. The Eighth Circuit has held that designating an agent for service of
process through state business statutes is one of the most “solidly established ways”
of providing consent to jurisdiction. See Knowlton v. Allied Van Lines, Inc., 900 F.2d
1196, 1199 (8th Cir. 1990).
146
916 F.2d 1239 (7th Cir. 1990).
147
Id. at 1241.
148
Id. at 1245.
149
Id.
150
Wilson, 916 F.2d at 1245.
151
632 F.3d 570 (9th Cir. 2011).
152
Id. at 572.
153
Id.
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conducted any business in Montana.154 When Colorado residents
brought suit against the company in Montana following a
motorcycle accident there, the district court dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction because the company had never issued policies in
Montana.155 On appeal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed.156
The court reasoned that the exercise of general jurisdiction
was improper because the insurance company had “done nothing
more than dip its toe in the water.”157 The state’s interest in
corporate oversight does not exist if the corporation is not
invoking the privileges of conducting business in the state.158 In
short, the quid pro quo relationship relied on in previous cases
simply did not exist.159 Therefore, registering to do business
alone, without some greater activity within the state, was not
enough to justify general jurisdiction.160
As this survey of decisions has shown, lower courts were
unable to agree on the legitimacy of basing general jurisdiction
on business registration statutes in the period before Daimler.
The resulting three-way split among the Circuits has continued
to muddy the waters after Daimler, making the need for explicit
registration statutes apparent.
II. CONSENT-BASED JURISDICTION: POST-DAIMLER
Since Daimler, lower courts have relied on registration
statutes as one way of asserting general jurisdiction over foreign
corporations.161 These statutes, enacted by state legislatures,
provide a valuable tool for courts. In essence, the statutes
require that a corporation register to do business with the state

154
Id. The court considered the insurance company “99.99% ‘Montana free.’ ”
Id.; see also Matthew Kipp, Inferring Express Consent: The Paradox of Permitting
Registration Statutes to Confer General Jurisdiction, 9 REV. LITIG. 1, 24 (1990).
155
King, 632 F.3d at 573.
156
Id. at 580.
157
Id. at 572.
158
See id. The precedent cited by the court rested on the state courts’
interpretation of governing state statutes. See Pa. Fire Ins. Co. of Phila. v. Gold
Issue Mining & Milling Co., 243 U.S. 93, 96 (1917); Chipman, Ltd. v. Thomas B.
Jeffrey Co., 251 U.S. 373, 379 (1920) (holding that New York’s registration statute
only applied to corporations actually conducting business in New York).
159
See King, 632 F.3d at 575.
160
Id. at 580.
161
See Donald Earl Childress III, General Jurisdiction After Bauman, 66 VAND.
L. REV. EN BANC 197, 202 (2014) (concluding that lower courts will continue to find
creative methods of establishing general jurisdiction).
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to obtain permission to conduct business in the state.162 Part of
registering involves the corporation consenting to the state’s
exercise of general jurisdiction in future litigation.163 Therefore,
consent-based jurisdiction represents the foundation of personal
jurisdiction case law: a quid pro quo agreement between the
foreign corporation, which gains the privileges and protections of
the state, and the forum state, which gains the right to hold
those operating within its borders accountable.164
A.

Vera v. Republic of Cuba: New York’s Tradition of ConsentBased Jurisdiction

After Daimler, courts began reexamining their traditional
framework of consent-based general jurisdiction.165 A pointed
example involved foreign banks that had registered to do
business in New York. Vera v. Republic of Cuba166 dealt with two
U.S. citizens bringing suit against Cuba under the Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA).167 One plaintiff alleged that
the Cuban regime extra-judicially killed her brother after a sham
trial in 1960.168 The other alleged that agents of the Castro
regime sentenced his father to death in absentia and
assassinated him in 1976.169 Both were granted judgments from

162
See Bagdon v. Phila. & Reading Coal & Iron Co., 217 N.Y. 432, 436–37, 111
N.E. 1075, 1076 (1916).
163
See Rockefeller Univ. v. Ligand Pharms., 581 F. Supp. 2d 461, 466 (S.D.N.Y.
2008) (explaining registration to do business as consent to jurisdiction).
164
See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 476 (1985) (reasoning
that obtaining protections and benefits from the forum make it “presumptively not
unreasonable” to submit to jurisdiction).
165
See Marshall Fishman & David Y. Livshiz, Do Recent Southern District
Decisions Undo ‘Daimler’?, N.Y. L.J.: OUTSIDE COUNSEL (June 11, 2015),
http://www.newyorklawjournal.com/id=1202728945298/Do-Recent-SouthernDistrict-Decisions-Undo-Daimler?slreturn=20170312130306 (explaining that recent
decisions “demonstrate the reluctance of lower courts to apply such a restrictive
approach to general jurisdiction”).
166
91 F. Supp. 3d 561 (S.D.N.Y. 2015).
167
Id. at 563–64. The purpose of FSIA was “to endorse and codify the restrictive
theory of sovereign immunity” and to transfer to the courts responsibility for
deciding immunity claims of foreign states. See Samantar v. Yousuf, 560 U.S. 305,
313 (2010).
168
Vera v. Republic of Cuba, 40 F. Supp. 3d 367, 370 (S.D.N.Y. 2014)
(determining plaintiffs’ state court judgments were entitled to full faith and credit).
169
Id. at 371.
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a Florida Circuit Court and sought to execute those judgments
against Cuban assets transferred through the defendant banks in
New York.170
The defendant banks argued that, under Daimler, New York
lacked jurisdiction because the events at the center of the
litigation occurred outside of the state and the banks could not be
considered “at home” in the forum.171 Plaintiffs argued that
under New York Banking Law § 200(a), a foreign bank must
register to conduct business in the state, thereby providing
jurisdiction.172 The court held that the foreign banks consented
to the “necessary regulatory oversight in return for permission to
operate in New York” and thus subjected themselves to the
court’s general jurisdiction.173
In his decision, Judge Hellerstein emphasized principles
similar to those propounded by Justice Sotomayor in her Daimler
concurrence.174 First, the district court reasoned that Daimler
cannot be read so broadly as to prohibit any oversight over
foreign actors.175 The court observed that foreign corporations
doing business in New York should not receive preferential
treatment over domestic banks, but instead must be bound by
the same rules.176
Additionally, the court noted that New York has routinely
held foreign corporations accountable through applications of
general jurisdiction under a consent-based justification.177 While
Daimler may have cast doubt on that practice,178 the decision
never explicitly outlawed it.179 Finally, the authorization of
jurisdiction stems from the contractual relationship between the

170

Vera, 91 F. Supp. 3d at 564.
Id. The Banco Bilbao was neither incorporated in New York nor had its
principal place of business there. Id. at 570.
172
Id.
173
Id. at 571.
174
Compare id. at 570 with Daimler AG. v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 768–69
(2014) (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
175
Vera, 91 F. Supp. 3d at 571.
176
Id. at 570. The court compared the foreign corporation’s action to a legitimate
business that launders money in its back room. Id. at 571.
177
Id. at 566.
178
Id. (noting that Daimler casts doubt on the “doing business” analysis); see
also Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 761 n.18 (majority opinion).
179
See Gucci Am., Inc. v. Weixing Li, 768 F.3d 122, 136 n.15 (2d Cir. 2014).
171
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forum state and the foreign corporation.180 If a corporation
registers to do business within the state, it cannot then decide
that it would prefer not to be hauled into that state’s courts.181
Therefore, the court concluded, New York properly exercised
jurisdiction over the foreign banks.182
B.

The Challenges Courts Face with Consent Statutes PostDaimler

Not all courts have been so willing to adapt the consentbased justification to a post-Daimler landscape. Many courts
have taken the opinion at face value, assuming that “at home”
refers only to the corporation’s principal place of business or state
of incorporation. In addition, some courts have been stymied by
the lack of explicit language in state statutes.183
For example, in McCourt v. A.O. Smith Water Products
Co.,184 James McCourt and his wife, Mabel, residents of Florida,
brought a tort action against a number of manufacturing
corporations for injuries arising from asbestos exposure.185 The
McCourts sued in federal court in New Jersey, and the defendant
corporation filed a motion to dismiss.186 Unable to show that the
corporation was essentially “at home” in New Jersey,187 the
McCourts contended that the corporation consented to
jurisdiction when it registered to do business in New Jersey.188

180
Vera, 91 F. Supp. 3d at 570 (noting that the benefits associated with a
foreign bank operating in New York “give rise to commensurate, reciprocal
obligations”).
181
Id. at 571 (“When corporations receive the benefits of operating in this forum,
it is critical that regulators and courts continue to have the power to compel
information concerning their activities.”).
182
Id.
183
See Acorda Therapeutics, Inc. v. Mylan Pharms., Inc., 817 F.3d 755, 767
(Fed. Cir. 2016) (O’Malley, J., concurring) (arguing that Daimler did not overrule
precedent establishing that a corporation may consent to general jurisdiction
through a registration statute).
184
Civ. Act. No. 14-221, 2015 WL 4997403 (D. N.J. Aug. 20, 2015). See also
Display Works, LLC v. Bartley, Civ. Act. No. 16-583, 2016 WL 1644451, at *6 (D.
N.J. Apr. 25, 2016) (holding that the court could not exercise general jurisdiction
because the New Jersey registration statute did not explicitly grant that authority).
185
McCourt, 2015 WL 4997403, at *1.
186
Id.
187
Id. at *3 (noting that the corporation maintained no bank accounts in the
forum, did not own any property, leased only two office spaces, and had only 30
employees in the state compared to its 63,000 nationwide).
188
Id.
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The court granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss, holding that
registering to do business alone could not be considered
consent.189
The district court relied on Third Circuit precedent
establishing a long tradition of general jurisdiction based on
registration statutes.190 The seminal case, Bane v. Netlink,
Inc.,191 held that a foreign corporation registered to do business in
Pennsylvania had consented to Pennsylvania’s exercise of
general jurisdiction.192
However, while the McCourt court
recognized that Bane remained good law even after Daimler,193 it
nonetheless distinguished the facts in that case from those in
McCourt.194 Because New Jersey lacked an explicit statute
authorizing courts to exercise general jurisdiction over foreign
corporations registered to do business in the state, as had existed
in Pennsylvania, Bane could not be applied.195 Without that
explicit grant, the court was powerless.
The District of Oregon faced a similar dilemma in Lanham v.
Pilot Travel Centers, LLC.196 An Oregon resident brought suit
against a Delaware company when he tripped over a block of
concrete at one of the company’s locations in Idaho.197 While the
corporation’s contacts with Oregon were continuous, they did not
Therefore, the plaintiff
reach the “at home” threshold.198
alternatively argued that the corporation consented to Oregon’s
general jurisdiction when it registered to do business there.199

189

Id. at *4.
Id.
191
925 F.2d 637 (3d Cir. 1991).
192
Id. at 641.
193
McCourt, 2015 WL 4997403, at *4.
194
Id. Regardless of the general jurisdiction analysis, it does not seem that the
McCourts had a particularly strong case.
195
Id.; see also Bane, 925 F.2d at 641.
196
No. 03:14-cv-01923-HZ, 2015 WL 5167268 (D. Or. Sept. 2, 2015).
197
Id. at *1.
198
Id. at *4. The corporation maintained 550 travel centers across North
America, including ten in Oregon. Id. Additionally, the court noted that the
defendant employed 521 employees in Oregon and owned real property within the
state, but never derived more than 2% of its revenue from Oregon business. Id. at
*1.
199
Id. Plaintiff argued business registration statutes provided “an independent
method of establishing personal jurisdiction,” while defendant argued that consent is
no longer a valid analysis for general jurisdiction post-Daimler. Id. at *4.
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The court noted the difficulty of resolving the issue in the
absence of any post-Daimler federal appellate cases on the
subject and in view of the conflicting district court decisions.200
Still, the court determined that consent would be a valid
justification for general jurisdiction if a state statute explicitly
authorized it.201 Accordingly, a court must first look to the “plain
language” of the statute as enacted by the legislature and, if that
is insufficient, to the interpretation of the statute by state
courts.202 For that reason, the court in in Lanham rejected the
plaintiff’s argument.
More recently, the Second Circuit grappled with these same
issues. In Brown v. Lockheed Martin Corp.,203 the court faced the
“nettlesome and increasingly contentious question” of consent to
general jurisdiction through business registration statutes.204
While the court did not say registration statutes could never be
the basis for general jurisdiction, it seemed to take Daimler to
the extreme, exemplifying the very arguments Justice Sotomayor
worried about in her concurrence.205 Brown, a resident of
Connecticut, brought suit against Lockheed Martin on behalf of
her father to recover tort injuries sustained from asbestos
exposure while he was an Air Force airplane mechanic.206 While
the exposure occurred in Europe and across the United States, it
did not occur in Connecticut.207
First, the court ruled that the Connecticut statute at issue
was not explicit enough and did not “speak to the relationship
between process so served and the state courts’ jurisdiction.”208
And while Connecticut courts had previously held that the
statute in question did confer general jurisdiction,209 those
rulings were pre-Daimler.210 More importantly, the statute did

200

See id. at *5.
See id. at *5–6 (discussing King v. Am. Family Mut. Ins., 632 F.3d 570, 576
(9th Cir. 2011)).
202
Id. at *6.
203
814 F.3d 619 (2d Cir. 2016).
204
Id. at 622.
205
See id.
206
See id. at 623.
207
Id.
208
Id. at 634.
209
See Talenti v. Morgan & Bro. Manhattan Storage Co., 968 A.2d 933, 940
(Conn. App. Ct. 2009).
210
See Brown, 814 F.3d at 639.
201
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not “contain express language alerting the potential registrant
that by complying with the statute . . . it would be agreeing to
submit to the general jurisdiction of the state courts.”211
Additionally, the court toed the Daimler line, misconstruing
decades of general jurisdiction precedent.212 Compared to its
“substantial activity worldwide,” Lockheed’s Connecticut contacts
Its contacts, although
were grossly disproportionate.213
systematic and continuous,214 simply did not reach the level of
being “essentially at home.”215 And so, while Lockheed has had a
physical presence in the state for three decades, Connecticut
lacks general jurisdiction over its activities.216 However, the
Second Circuit still noted that “a carefully drawn state statute
that expressly required consent to general jurisdiction as a
condition on a foreign corporation’s doing business in the state, at
least in cases brought by state residents, might well be
constitutional.”217 In other words, all is not lost.
Thus, in order for courts to validly exercise general
jurisdiction over foreign corporations, clear and explicit statutes
authorizing such jurisdiction must exist. Without the plain
language of the statute, courts will be bound by the restrictive
confines of Daimler and will not be able to exercise general
jurisdiction over foreign corporations when citizens of the state
seek recourse.
III. EXPLICIT REGISTRATION STATUTES: A NEW FRONTIER OF AN
OLD TRADITION
Properly drafted registration statutes, including an explicit
statement that registering to do business constitutes consent to
general jurisdiction, are a legitimate means to general
jurisdiction that should be utilized. New York has led the way by
introducing legislation in the State Assembly and State Senate
providing a proper remedy to the general jurisdiction ailment.
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Id. at 636.
See Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct 746, 773 (2014) (Sotomayor, J.,
concurring).
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Brown, 814 F.3d at 623.
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Id.
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Id.
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Id. at 628.
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Id. at 641.
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New York’s Pending Legislation for Consent-Based
Jurisdiction

In the spring of 2014, concerned about the consequences of
Daimler for decades of New York case law, Chief Administrative
Judge Gail Prudenti requested that the state legislature amend
licensure statutes for foreign corporations conducting business in
New York.218 By June, the legislation was drafted and approved
by advisory committees.219 The companion bills, Assembly Bill
9576 and Senate Bill 7078, would amend Business Corporation
Law (“BCL”) § 1301, and similar statutes, by codifying case law,
making it unequivocal that a foreign corporation’s application to
do business in New York constitutes consent to jurisdiction in all
actions against the corporation.220 While the Assembly bill
passed on June 2, 2014, the Senate bill only made it through the
Judiciary Committee before the 2014 session ended.221 However,
the bill’s sponsor, Senator John Bonacic, reintroduced the bill at
the beginning of the 2015 session.222 It passed the Judiciary
Committee with bipartisan support on June 25, 2015 and is
currently awaiting a floor vote.223
The 2015 version is identical to the earlier version.224 It
amends New York’s Civil Practice Law and Rules, the Business
Corporation Law, and all related laws to explicitly provide that
registration to conduct business in New York is the equivalent to
consenting to the state’s jurisdiction.225 The legislation is not

218
Alison Frankel, New York’s (Stalled) Grab for Jurisdiction over Foreign
Businesses, REUTERS (June 30, 2014), http://blogs.reuters.com/alison-frankel/2014/
06/30/new-yorks-stalled-grab-for-jurisdiction-over-foreign-businesses.
219
See id.
220
Brian J. Farrar, Jurisdiction in New York Courts, FED. B. COUNCIL Q., (Aug.
21, 2014), http://federalbarcouncilquarterly.org/?p=311.
221
See Frankel, supra note 218.
222
Lanier Saperstein, et al., New York State Legislature Seeks to Overturn
‘Daimler,’ N.Y. L.J.: Outside Counsel (May 20, 2015), http://www.newyorklawj
ournal.com/id=1202726893242/New-York-State-Legislature-Seeks-to-OverturnDaimler.
223
The vote was 15 in favor, 6 in favor with reservation, and 2 excused. The
legislators voting in favor of the legislation were both politically and geographically
diverse. The ayes included Senator Bonacic, a Republican from Orange County;
Majority Leader Flanagan, a Republican from Nassau County; Senator Avella, a
Democrat from Queens; and Senator Savino, a member of the IndependentDemocratic Conference from Staten Island/Brooklyn.
224
See N.Y.S. 4846, 238th Sess. (2015), WL 2015 NY S.B. 4846 (NS).
225
See id.
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perfect, but it represents an important step to ensuring that
state courts have the ability to properly oversee foreign
corporations.
First, the bill provides the plain language courts need to rely
on consent as the means for asserting general jurisdiction over a
foreign corporation. Second, the statute comports with the long
history of personal jurisdiction in New York and throughout the
United States. Finally, it satisfies an important public interest
by ensuring states have oversight over corporations that choose
to conduct business within their borders.
B.

Addressing the Criticism of Consent-Based Jurisdiction

Critics of consent-based jurisdiction founded on registration
statutes focus on three main areas: the fairness, burden, and
predictability to the defendant; the risk of increasing forum
shopping; and the risk of “universal jurisdiction.”
1.

Fairness, Burden, Predictability, and Coerced Consent

Critics charge that consent-based jurisdiction is not consent
at all. Instead, the argument is that registration provides the
guise of consent, but in reality acts as a gun to the head, forcing
corporations to enter a contractual relationship.226 This coercion,
critics contend, leads to limited fairness, substantial burdens,
and rampant unpredictability for defendant corporations.227
However, these concerns can be alleviated by carefully drafting
the registration statutes granting jurisdiction.
Fairness based on explicit authority is within the realm of
due process. That explicit authority must be expressed in clear
statutory language. Once specific language is inserted into the
statutory scheme, notice is provided to corporations, thus
fulfilling due process requirements. In fact, a large part of the
debate has involved the specific language of the legislation. For
example, opponents of the proposed New York legislation have
been primarily concerned with specific language, not necessarily

226

See Monestier, supra note 15, at 1387.
See Lee Scott Taylor, Note, Registration Statutes, Personal Jurisdiction, and
the Problem of Predictability, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1163, 1165 (2003); Monestier,
supra note 15, at 1402 (arguing that registration statutes as a means to general
jurisdiction fails “common sense” by granting “universal jurisdiction”).
227
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the theory of general jurisdiction itself.228 The New York City
Bar Association Committee on Banking, while also raising
constitutional concerns,229 lobbied to amend the language of the
bill to exclude banks.230 Therefore, the debate is focused on
which, if any, groups of corporations should be excluded from the
revised jurisdictional reach.231
Further establishing fairness, the proposed statute comports
with the long history of personal jurisdiction broadly, as well as
general jurisdiction, because it respects a contractual
relationship. Since International Shoe, the underpinning of
personal jurisdiction has been the “traditional notions of fair play
and substantial justice.”232 Moreover, since Bagdon and Tauza,
New York has emphasized the important contractual
relationship between a foreign corporation and the forum state.233
Both values are achieved by this legislation because corporations
are put on notice while simultaneously being forced to
acknowledge the agreement.
The importance of this contractual relationship has been a
foundational democratic political value,234 and the fairness
factors emphasized in personal jurisdiction jurisprudence are
achieved through honoring that tradition.235 Further, states have
228
See Letter from John J. Clarke, Jr., Chairman, N.Y. City Bar Ass’n Comm.
on Banking, to Hon. Bonacic & Hon. Weinstein, N.Y.C. B. Assoc. Committee on
Banking L., (April 9, 2014).
229
The Committee argued that the legislation violates the Due Process Clause
and Commerce Clause, and cited three district court opinions since Daimler, but
ignored other cases that have disagreed with its position. Id.
230
See id. Of course, other incentives could be the basis for the committee’s
concerns considering its special interest representing the banking industry.
However, banks make up an important class of corporation that demands state
jurisdictional oversight. See, e.g., Vera v. Republic of Cuba, 91 F. Supp. 3d 561
(S.D.N.Y. 2015).
231
Likely, no groups of corporations should be excluded, but that is a debate for
the floor of the New York State Senate.
232
Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (quoting Milliken v.
Meyer 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)).
233
See discussion supra Section I.B.1; see also Brief for the United States as
Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, DaimlerChrysler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct.
746 (2014) (No. 11-965), 2013 WL 3377321, at *28 (arguing that within the “broad
limits” of Due Process, “a State has latitude to provide for the exercise of personal
jurisdiction over a foreign defendant on the basis of someone else’s direct or physical
contacts with the State”).
234
See Michalski, supra note 26, at 164.
235
See Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 423
(1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (noting that as “active participants” in commerce,
corporations have an obligation to be amenable to “suit in any forum that is
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a responsibility to treat foreign corporations the same as
domestic corporations, holding both to the same regulatory
standards.236
In fact, Justice Ginsburg suggested that an
exceptional circumstance under Daimler could arise if the foreign
corporation was “comparable to a domestic enterprise in that
state.”237 Equality is all that is sought.
Finally, jurisdiction as a means of ensuring corporate
accountability becomes even more necessary as we become an
increasingly globalized world, connected in all aspects of
economic life.238 Granting states more autonomy and authority
in jurisdiction should be encouraged because it ensures increased
corporate accountability.239 In fact, the purpose of statutes such
as New York’s Business Corporation Law is to regulate foreign
corporations and put them on equal footing with their in-state
counterparts.240
The proposed legislation also satisfies predictability
concerns.241
The Daimler majority worried that, in an
increasingly international world, it would be unfair to force
corporations to defend themselves in multiple forums because
there would be no way to predict where they might be sued.242
However, under a consent-based framework, a foreign

significantly affected by the corporation’s commercial activities.”); see also Michalski,
supra note 26, at 185 (arguing that submitting to jurisdiction is a “political
obligation” of corporations).
236
See Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 773 (2014) (Sotomayor, J.,
concurring) (concluding that under the court’s framework, a U.S. business that
enters a contract with an international corporation that subsequently breaches may
not be able to seek relief in U.S. courts).
237
See id. at 758 n.11 (majority opinion) (quoting Goodyear Dunlop Tires
Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 919 (2011)).
238
See McGee v. Int’l Life Ins., 355 U.S. 220, 222 (1957) (a fundamental growth
in the national economy has made the expansion of state jurisdiction permissible).
239
See Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 423 (Brennan, J., dissenting); see also Barriere
v. Juluca, No. 12–23510–CIV, 2014 WL 652831, at *8–9 (S.D. Fla. 2014) (arguing
that restricting jurisdiction “would effectively deprive American citizens from
litigating in the United States”).
240
Reese v. Harper Surface Finishing Sys., 129 A.D.2d 159, 162, 517 N.Y.S.2d
522, 524 (2d Dep’t 1987) (noting that B.C.L. § 1312 was enacted to ensure that
foreign corporations were not given an unfair advantage over in-state corporations).
241
See Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 762–63.
242
Id. at 761–62.
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corporation could readily predict where it might be sued: in any
forum where it had registered to do business under a clear and
explicit registration statute.243
Additionally, foreign corporations would not be overly
burdened by having to defend themselves in multiple
jurisdictions. As the Ninth Circuit explained, international
corporations would not be disadvantaged due to the breadth of
their business.244 Moreover, while litigation in a foreign forum
may be an inconvenience for international corporations, that is
part of the bargain.245 Therefore, a registration statute with
explicit language of consent satisfies traditional notions of
fairness, and also recognizes the value of strong contractual
relationships that have been essential to our history of personal
jurisdiction.
2.

Risk of Forum Shopping

Critics of registration statutes as consent to general
jurisdiction have argued that such actions represent the “last
bastion[] of forum shopping.”246 Forum shopping is the process by
which a plaintiff may search for a favorable, if arbitrary, forum
in which to bring claims. Critics argue that if all states exercised
consent-based jurisdiction, there would be a free-for-all of
plaintiffs busily shopping around for the best forum.247 This
argument is not persuasive for two reasons. First, “forum

243
See id. at 770 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (arguing “there is nothing
unpredictable about a rule” that subjects corporations to general jurisdiction in each
state where they have substantial contacts); see also Von Mehren & Trautman,
supra note 17, at 1138 (noting jurisdiction based on consent is easily administered
and “relatively precise”).
244
See Bauman v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 644 F.3d 909, 925 (9th Cir. 2011),
rev’d sub nom., Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746 (2014); see also McGee v. Int’l
Life Ins., 355 U.S. 220, 224 (1957) (determining that litigating in a foreign forum
may be inconvenient, but it is not a denial of due process).
245
See Frummer v. Hilton Hotels Int’l, Inc., 19 N.Y.2d 533, 538, 227 N.E.2d 851,
854, 281 N.Y.S.2d 41, 45 (1967) (arguing that while litigation in a foreign forum may
be burdensome, “it is part of the price which may properly be demanded of those who
extensively engage in international trade . . . . [Corporations] receive considerable
benefits from such foreign business and may not be heard to complain about the
burdens”).
246
See Monestier, supra note 15, at 1413; see also Coal. of Ariz./N.M. Ctys. for
Stable Econ. Growth v. Dep’t of Interior, 100 F.3d 837, 844 (10th Cir. 1996) (calling
forum shopping the “most disfavored practice”).
247
Selecting the best forum could be based on liberal statutes of limitation,
beneficial tort or contract laws, or favorable juries or demographics.
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shopping” has never been the epidemic critics feared, even in the
years before Daimler. Second, restricting general jurisdiction is
not the best way to combat frivolous suits being brought in
favorable forums.
First, forum shopping is not the evil critics have warned
against.248 Chief Justice Rehnquist endorsed forum shopping as
a “litigation strategy of countless plaintiffs,”249 while Judge
Widener of the Fourth Circuit noted, “[t]here is nothing
inherently evil about forum-shopping.”250
Instead, forum
shopping, despite the negative label, should be considered
dedicated advocacy,251 fundamentally embedded in the American
legal tradition.252 The concern should not be forum shopping for
its own sake, as some commentators would have it, but unfair
“advantage-seeking activit[ies].”253 In the realm of consent-based
jurisdiction, benign forum shopping may result, but malignant
forum shopping would not.
Moreover, even if forum shopping generally were a cause for
concern, the more important concern is whether plaintiffs are
able to bring suit in their home states at all. These plaintiffs
have no need to forum shop; litigation in their home forum is
convenient enough. Therefore, the need to address forum
shopping is not as related to fairness to the defendant as some
critics insist.
Finally, the best solution to address malignant forum
shopping is not to constrict jurisdiction, but to encourage judicial
gate keeping. The doctrine of forum non conveniens, whereby a
court may determine that it is not the best forum for the pending
248
See Note, Forum Shopping Reconsidered, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1677, 1695
(1990) (concluding that forum shopping is not simply “an evil to be avoided” and
safeguards exist to prevent abuses).
249
See Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 779 (1984).
250
See Goad v. Celotex Corp., 831 F.2d 508, 512 n.12 (4th Cir. 1987).
251
See Friedrich K. Juenger, Forum Shopping, Domestic and International, 63
TUL. L. REV. 553, 573 (1989); see also Tex. Instruments, Inc. v. Micron
Semiconductors, Inc., 815 F. Supp. 994, 996 (E.D. Tex. 1993) (“In reality, every
litigant who files a lawsuit engages in forum shopping when he chooses a place to
file suit.”).
252
See Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Exorcising the Evil of ForumShopping, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 1507, 1509 (1995) (“The American way is to provide
plaintiffs with a wide choice of venues.”); Mary Garvey Algero, In Defense of Forum
Shopping: A Realistic Look at Selecting a Venue, 78 NEB. L. REV. 79, 82 (2014).
253
See Richard Maloy, Forum Shopping? What’s Wrong with That?, 24
QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 25, 33 (2005); see also Ferens v. John Deere Co., 494 U.S. 516,
527 (1990).
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litigation, is the more appropriate tool.254 Restricting general
jurisdiction risks preventing plaintiffs from having their day in
court, and registration statutes work to provide convenience for a
plaintiff to bring suit in their home forum. At the same time, by
utilizing forum non conveniens,255 courts can still ensure fairness
to defendant corporations.256
In conclusion, the forum shopping criticism of consent-based
jurisdiction is merely a fiction premised on the ill-founded and
outmoded apprehension of forum shopping in general.
3.

Universal Jurisdiction

To hold a state amenable to suit in multiple forums is not
“universal jurisdiction,” it is simply the same jurisdiction we
have always had.257 In fact, it is Daimler that departed from
settled historical precedent. For generations, jurisdiction has
been premised on the relationship between the corporation and
the forum state, not on the relationship between the corporation
and other states or countries.258 Now, the Court has abandoned
decades of precedent in order to restrict jurisdiction, just as
Justice Black warned in his International Shoe concurring
opinion.259 Indeed, even Justice Ginsburg warned about the
dangers of limiting jurisdiction too strictly, only three years
before Daimler.260 To ignore precedent and historical practice is

254
See Daniel J. Dorward, Comment, The Forum Non Conveniens Doctrine and
the Judicial Protection of Multinational Corporations from Forum Shopping
Plaintiffs, 19 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 141, 142 (1998).
255
See Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 508 (1947); see also Piper Aircraft
Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 255 n.23 (1981).
256
See Iragorri v. United Techs. Corp., 274 F.3d 65, 72 (2d Cir. 2001).
257
Universal jurisdiction refers to foreign corporations being hauled in to any
court among the fifty states. See supra Section III.B.1 for a discussion on Fairness,
Burden, Predictability, and Coerced Consent.
258
See Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 768 (2014) (Sotomayor, J.,
concurring) (noting precedent has developed from “the concept of reciprocal
fairness”); see also Justice Sonia Sotomayor & Linda Greenhouse, A Conversation
with Justice Sotomayor, 123 YALE L.J. FORUM 375, 386 (2014) (“The Court
announced a rule limiting the test for general jurisdiction on a set of facts that were
the worst for the exercise of jurisdiction.”).
259
See Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 326 (1945) (Black, J.,
concurring) (quoting Baldwin v. Missouri, 281 U.S. 586, 595 (1930) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting)).
260
See J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873, 893–94 (2011)
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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not only inconsistent with constitutional theory, it “creates
divergent bodies of case law,” resulting in further confusion for
future plaintiffs, defendants, and courts.261
Additionally, allowing states to exercise general jurisdiction
through registration statutes would leave the discretion to do so
in the hands of the individual states. Some states may choose
not to enact such statutes. For example, Delaware’s procorporate climate may make it undesirable for the state’s
legislature to pass such a statute. Moreover, Delaware would be
an exceptional case because so many corporations are also
incorporated there, making those corporations amenable to suit
under Daimler’s framework alone. However, states in which
many corporations have a large presence, but in which few are
actually incorporated, face an unfair disadvantage in meaningful
oversight. Therefore, the risk of “universal jurisdiction” is not
much of a risk at all.
C.

Improving the New York Legislation

The proposed New York registration statute is not perfect.
While it provides plain language that courts have always relied
on to exercise general jurisdiction, it could still be more explicit.
Moreover, a presence analysis should be added to ensure fairness
to defendant corporations.
As Chief Judge Cardozo expressed at the dawn of New York’s
tradition of consent-based jurisdiction, establishing general
jurisdiction based on a registration statute is about construing a
contract.262 The bargained-for exchange between the state and
the corporation should be clearly defined. While the language of
the proposed New York statute is strong, it should be more
explicit. For example, the statute never mentions “general
jurisdiction,” but instead declares that registration “constitutes
consent to the jurisdiction of the courts of this state for all actions
against such corporation.”263 In order to remove any question as
to the extent courts may rely on the statute, language should be
added clarifying that the cause of action against the corporation
261
See Cornett & Hoffheimer, supra note 89, at 161; see also Daimler, 134 S. Ct.
at 773 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (“[T]he Court adopts a new rule of constitutional
law that is unmoored from decades of precedent.”).
262
See Bagdon v. Phila. & Reading Coal & Iron Co., 217 N.Y. 432, 438, 111 N.E.
1075, 1077 (1916).
263
See N.Y.S. 4846, 238th Sess. (2015), WL 2015 NY S.B. 4846 (NS).
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need not arise within the state.264 This provision would make
clear to the corporation that registration to do business in New
York is consent to the general jurisdiction of her courts.
Additionally, consent to jurisdiction through a registration
statute does not automatically remove the need for judicial
inquiry into the corporation’s contacts with the state.265
Minimum contacts with the state are still an important element
despite the registration to do business.266 For instance, if a
corporation registers to do business in New York, but never
actually conducts any business there, it would not be fair to
subject the corporation to general jurisdiction. To paraphrase
the Ninth Circuit, dipping a toe in New York waters is not
enough.267 The corporation must have sufficient affiliation with
the state such that there is “political consent” for the exercise of
jurisdiction.268 Actually conducting business within the state is
enough to make a corporation an insider, separate and distinct
from incorporation or domicile.269 An evaluation of reasonable
jurisdiction is thus based on the relationship formed between
state and corporation.270 Therefore, the same evaluation used by
Chief Judge Cardozo is embraced: Is the corporation here?271 If
it has consented to jurisdiction in exchange for doing business,
and is actually doing business, general jurisdiction may be
exercised.

264
For example, the amended proposal would read: “A foreign corporation’s
application for authority to do business in this state, whenever filed, constitutes
consent to the general jurisdiction of the courts of this state for all actions against
such corporation, occurring within or outside of the state.”
265
See King v. Am. Family Mut. Ins., 632 F.3d 570, 572 (9th Cir. 2011) (“Mere
appointment of an agent for service of process cannot serve as a talismanic coupon to
bypass [minimum contacts].”).
266
See Wilson v. Humphreys (Cayman) Ltd., 916 F.2d 1239, 1245 (7th Cir.
1990).
267
King, 632 F.3d at 572. The “toe” in King was the appointment of an agent for
the service of process, as required by Montana statute. Id. In this case, the same
rationale would apply for the registration to do business.
268
See Roger H. Trangsrud, The Federal Common Law of Personal Jurisdiction,
57 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 849, 853 (1989); Sarah R. Cebik, “A Riddle Wrapped in a
Mystery Inside an Enigma”: General Personal Jurisdiction and Notions of
Sovereignty, 1998 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 1, 28 (1998).
269
See Lea Brilmayer, How Contacts Count: Due Process Limitation on State
Court Jurisdiction, 1980 SUP. CT. REV. 77, 87.
270
See Cebik, supra note 268, at 24.
271
See Tauza v. Susquehanna Coal Co., 220 N.Y. 259, 268–69, 115 N.E. 915, 918
(1917).
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CONCLUSION
Today, we protect multibillion dollar foreign corporations
from any inconvenience, preferring to make plaintiffs forego a
bite of the apple. That cannot be the intention of Daimler. For
decades, the Constitution was generally interpreted to respect a
state’s autonomy to determine the extent of its jurisdiction over
those corporations that choose to enter its borders, conduct
business, and take advantage of its laws. Suddenly, the Daimler
decision has called into doubt decades of precedent. Consentbased jurisdiction derived from a registration to do business
statute remedies the unintended consequences of Daimler.
For many recent commentators, it is easier to simply dismiss
consent-based jurisdiction as outside the bounds of modern
doctrine. But what about the Utah family that is denied relief
from a corporation hiding behind its foreign veil? What about a
consumer defrauded by an international manufacturer that may
be “too big” to be hauled into court? These concerns cannot be
simply flicked away.
A properly drafted consent-based
registration statute addresses the legitimate concerns of Justice
Sotomayor’s concurrence without going beyond the scope of the
Daimler ruling.

